Asia e dintorni

Qui le notizie sono due: la prima è che fino ad oggi qualcuno potesse entrare in Corea del Nord senza un visto; la seconda è che da oggi non si potrà più:

China and North Korea have cancelled reciprocal visa waivers for travel between the two countries, ending a system that has been in effect since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1949.
A source here said that North Korea moved first, requiring that Chinese citizens visiting the North for six months or less now obtain visas. The source said North Korean authorities were concerned at the number of Chinese visitors to North Korea's major cities and wanted to put a curb on "China's aggressive expansion in the North."
Beijing reciprocated on April 18, and while such tit-for-tat actions are common in international relations, another source said Beijing also wanted to try to curb the influx of North Korean refugees as it spruced up its international image for the 2008 Olympics.

Non si sa quale delle due motivazioni sia più demenziale.

Nei commenti ai due post precedenti è emerso il tema dell'arretratezza tecnologica dell'esercito cinese che ne limiterebbe le potenzialità offensive. Difficile che, se ce ne rendiamo conto noi, non ci arrivino anche a Pechino. E infatti:

China plans to accelerate efforts to modernize the world's largest army, state media reported Friday, a day after Beijing rejected a Pentagon report describing China as a potential military threat.

On Thursday the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense issued a 15-year plan approved by President Hu Jintao for developing high-tech industries for both military and civilian purposes, the Communist Party newspaper People's Daily reported.
The plan also aims to further develop manufacturing technology for military industries, apparently to lessen China's dependance on Russia for high-tech weaponry.

Ma torniamo a Taiwan. Chi scrive pensa che prima o dopo la questione dell'isola democratica che Pechino considera ribelle diventerà d'attualità. Alcuni dicono che le Olimpiadi potrebbero accelerare la resa dei conti ma sinceramente non è facile vedere un collegamento diretto tra i due eventi. Anche perché la Cina notoriamente non gioca con la fretta in ambito internazionale. China Confidential però osserva che le intenzioni del Partito Comunista Cinese a questo proposito sono piuttosto chiare:

Notice we said "when," not if, because it is becoming increasingly clear that unless Taipei eventually, well, surrenders to Beijing, there will be a war in the Taiwan Strait.

China's Communist Party rulers routinely brush off criticism of their military modernization and buildup by describing it as both defensive and "domestic"--meaning, targeting Taiwan--as if plotting to destroy a tiny democracy is an acceptable 21st century foreign policy objective. Rejecting the 2006 Pentagon report on China's alarming arms buildup, which was released this week, foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao, for example, stuck to the defensive/domestic party line in a news briefing. China's arms, Lieu asserted, were only aimed at bringing about reunification with "splittist" Taiwan.

e si chiede: cosa faranno gli Stati Uniti?

The US supports the status quo. But under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, Washington--while accepting Beijing's hoary "One China" principle--is also committed to helping Taiwan to defend itself against Chinese aggression by supplying the island with weapons.
With the release of the Pentagon report, the US let it be known that defending Taiwan could involve more than armaments. A senior defense department official told reporters that US military intervention is "a virtual certainty" in the event of a Chinese attack on the island.
Is Washington bluffing?

A Taiwan il presidente Chen non sta vivendo il suo miglior momento ma trova comunque il tempo per preparare il primo documento ufficiale sulla sicurezza nazionale nella storia del paese:

The 162-page document, issued after long delays and extensive debate among President Chen Shui-bian's advisers, was designed as a guideline for this and future governments in defending the self-ruled island against any attack from China, officials said. Reflecting Chen's dream of full Taiwanese independence, it postulates that Taiwan's "overall strategic goal is to guarantee the country's sovereignty."

In a recent interview, Chen said Taiwanese intelligence had information that China has a plan to attack the island within 10 years, but this assertion was not repeated in the strategy declaration.
Only by building up its own military and economic strength, the document declared, can Taiwan preserve its de facto independence and democratic system. To make that possible, it said, the government will boost military spending from 2.5 to 3 percent of gross domestic product.

Dovesse scoppiare un conflitto sappiamo già quali armi i pacifisti considereranno più minacciose.

Il riarmo cinese non è uno scherzo. Nonostante le colombe da guerra fredda, la natura del regime e l'incertezza sulle sue reali intenzioni giustificano l'allarme. A pensarla così anche Dan Blumenthal oggi sul WP:

By making the potential cost of any U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait extraordinarily high, Beijing has accomplished its decade-long goal of establishing a credible military threat to Taiwan -- as well as a deterrent to the United States. The question is, what next?
The report points to some answers. With a growing dependence on oil imported from the Middle East and Africa, Chinese strategists are talking about creating a blue-water navy to secure Beijing's energy supply lines. The military may be reconsidering its nuclear "no-first-use policy" and examining ways to secure China's territorial claims in the South China and East China seas.

For example, Beijing may conclude that relying on the U.S. Navy for the safety of its energy supplies is too risky, and decide to increase its naval presence along the expanse between the Persian Gulf and East Asia. This would make the Chinese navy the first since the Cold War to compete for sea control with the United States.

Le contromisure:

The Bush administration has taken some concrete action toward these ends. An upgraded alliance with Japan will improve our deterrent posture. The opening of a strategic relationship with India reflects in part an American desire to ensure that China does not gain hegemony over South or Central Asia. An increase in the size of the U.S. Navy's attack submarine fleet in Guam also brings more American capability into the Pacific. A nascent defense relationship with Vietnam may over time provide the American military with what it needs most in Asia -- more bases.

La chiave Taiwan:

But our China policy leaves us a day late and a dollar short when it comes to the challenge posed by the speed of Beijing's military buildup. We still have restrictions on relations with Taiwan dating to the Carter era that make the island more difficult to defend.

Insomma, nessuna paranoia ma occhi bene aperti.

Domani un treno avrebbe dovuto attraversare per la prima volta in quasi 50 anni il confine tra le due Coree. Ma i rapporti fra i fratelli separati sono da coniugare sempre al condizionale (passato).

Oggi tocca parlare di eserciti. Qualcuno griderà ai rigurgiti da guerra fredda ma la realtà è che l'armata cinese va presa sul serio. Il Pentagono ha reso noto l'ultimo rapporto sullo stato dell'arte delle guerra a Pechino e la fotografia non è confortante. I punti essenziali: aumento della produzione di missili a lunga gittata, rafforzamento delle unità militari terrestri nelle regioni di fronte a Taiwan, modernizzazione della forza aerea, attualizzazione delle testate nucleari. Ancora tranquilli? Leggete qui:

China has regularly raised its annual military budget by more than 10 per cent since the early 1990s.
"What little public information China releases about defense spending is further clouded by a multitude of funding sources, subsidies, and cutouts at all levels of government and in multiple ministries," the report says. "Real spending on the military, therefore, is so disaggregated that even the Chinese leadership may not know the actual top line between civil and military products. Machinery upgrades for civilian production are often intended for improved military production. Weapons production costs are thus partially defrayed by State Council subsidies, rather than funded wholly through the military budget."
(If even the Chinese Communist Party leadership is in the dark about actual costs, who is in charge? Who runs China? The military? The party? Some supremely powerful, overlapping clique? The report does not attempt answers; and as foreign journalists who have lived and worked in China know, the identities and decision-making processes of the real powers-that-be are vexing mysteries.)

Uso interno, recita la versione ufficiale in riferimento esplicito a Taiwan. Propaganda del Pentagono, fanno eco Bush-bashers e Hu-backers (ce ne sono tanti, troppi, in occidente). Voi tranquilli, peaceful rise.